I defend the view that addiction is a disability, like deafness or blindness. The priority of addiction policy should be the provision of reasonable accommodations for addicted persons.
This piece provides an
Thank you, I look forward to comments/questions/criticisms/objections! Please send them all to john-at-jmaier.net.
Chapter One: Foundations
(Available – Draft of 27 May 2021)
This chapter introduces options, explaining what they are and why they matter. I also draw connections between options and some adjacent areas of philosophy: the theory of modality, decision theory, and the free will debates.
Chapter Two: The Simplicity of Options
(Available – Draft of 27 May 2021)
I argue for the core negative thesis of the book: there is no analysis of what it is for an agent to have an option. Specifically, options are not to be analyzed in terms of counterfactuals or other modal constructions. I argue that we can articulate general principles about options – what I call the Performance Principle and the Possibility Principle – which will appeal to in the discussion that follows.
Chapter Three: The Analysis of Ability
(Available – Draft of 27 May 2021)
I give a theory of ability in terms of options. I begin by giving a semantics for sentences such as 'Sam is able to build a bookshelf' in terms of options. I then argue that what it is is for an agent to have an ability just is for such a sentence to be true of her. Quantification over abilities is to be understood in a deflationary way, such that what it is to have an ability is to have a certain range of options in a certain range of circumstances.
Chapter Four: A Picture of Agentive Possibility
(Available – Draft of 13 June 2021)
The picture that emerges from the previous chapters is one on which options constitute an irreducible foundation on which a theory of the modal aspects of agency may be built. I step back and contrast this picture with reductive 'Humean' accounts of agency and of possibility. This picture also however rejects an appeal to a robust 'Aristotelian' theory of agentive powers. The present view therefore falls outside the ambit of standard contemporary taxonomies in the theory of agency, as well as the theory of modality.
Chapter Five: Against Reconciliation
(Available – Draft of 27 July 2021)
There is a prima facie conflict between the fact that agents have multiple options and that our world may be governed by deterministic law. Hume proposed a reconciling project between these facts, which has proceeded in at least two ways. The way of reduction gives an analysis of options that shows them to be compatible with determinism. The way of sophistication says that other facts (such as moral responsibility) may be secured even if determinism is true. We should reject both these ways of reconciliation.
Chapter Six: Simple Compatibilism
(Not yet available for circulation – Email for info)
Simple compatibilism holds that agents have options, and that there is no reductive account of what it is to have an option. It also holds that our world might be governed by deterministic law. It also acknowledges the prima facie conflict between these facts. But it observes that any argument that this prima facie conflict is a real one will depend on a substantive principle about options – something stronger than the Performance Principle or the Possibility Principle – and it is that principle that the simple compatibilist holds we should reject.
3.
This piece provides an
Thank you, I look forward to comments/questions/criticisms/objections! Please send them all to john-at-jmaier.net.
Chapter One: Foundations
(Available – Draft of 27 May 2021)
This chapter introduces options, explaining what they are and why they matter. I also draw connections between options and some adjacent areas of philosophy: the theory of modality, decision theory, and the free will debates.
Chapter Two: The Simplicity of Options
(Available – Draft of 27 May 2021)
I argue for the core negative thesis of the book: there is no analysis of what it is for an agent to have an option. Specifically, options are not to be analyzed in terms of counterfactuals or other modal constructions. I argue that we can articulate general principles about options – what I call the Performance Principle and the Possibility Principle – which will appeal to in the discussion that follows.
Chapter Three: The Analysis of Ability
(Available – Draft of 27 May 2021)
I give a theory of ability in terms of options. I begin by giving a semantics for sentences such as 'Sam is able to build a bookshelf' in terms of options. I then argue that what it is is for an agent to have an ability just is for such a sentence to be true of her. Quantification over abilities is to be understood in a deflationary way, such that what it is to have an ability is to have a certain range of options in a certain range of circumstances.
Chapter Four: A Picture of Agentive Possibility
(Available – Draft of 13 June 2021)
The picture that emerges from the previous chapters is one on which options constitute an irreducible foundation on which a theory of the modal aspects of agency may be built. I step back and contrast this picture with reductive 'Humean' accounts of agency and of possibility. This picture also however rejects an appeal to a robust 'Aristotelian' theory of agentive powers. The present view therefore falls outside the ambit of standard contemporary taxonomies in the theory of agency, as well as the theory of modality.
Chapter Five: Against Reconciliation
(Available – Draft of 27 July 2021)
There is a prima facie conflict between the fact that agents have multiple options and that our world may be governed by deterministic law. Hume proposed a reconciling project between these facts, which has proceeded in at least two ways. The way of reduction gives an analysis of options that shows them to be compatible with determinism. The way of sophistication says that other facts (such as moral responsibility) may be secured even if determinism is true. We should reject both these ways of reconciliation.
Chapter Six: Simple Compatibilism
(Not yet available for circulation – Email for info)
Simple compatibilism holds that agents have options, and that there is no reductive account of what it is to have an option. It also holds that our world might be governed by deterministic law. It also acknowledges the prima facie conflict between these facts. But it observes that any argument that this prima facie conflict is a real one will depend on a substantive principle about options – something stronger than the Performance Principle or the Possibility Principle – and it is that principle that the simple compatibilist holds we should reject.
3.